JPRS L/9460 30 December 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

(FOUO 44/80)



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

TUNISTANS ENROLL IN IRAQI MILITIA—An article in Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French on 3 December 1980, page 93, reports the deaths of two Tunisian students killed in the Iraq-Iran conflict "during a raid on Iraq." Both young men had gone to Baghdad to complete their studies. Neither had indicated to his parents any hint of personal involvement in the conflict. The family of one of the students "will undoubtedly refuse the 1000 dinars offered by the [Iraqi] embassy to any Tunisian family whose offspring has fallen in Iraq." The same student's parents "have sent a telegram to president Bourguiba beseeching him to protest to the Iraqi authorities the conscription of young Tunisians in Saddam Hussein's army." In conclusion the article notes: "200 to 300 young Tunisians are said to have voluntarily signed up for service in Iraq's armed militia." [Editorial Report] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 3 Dec 80 p 93]

FRENCH ARMS DEALS--Qatar, a Persian Gulf state, has just contracted to buy 14 Mirage F1 from France. It had acquired last year six training airplanes Alpha-Jet. With this contract, Qatar becomes the fifth Middle East client of France for the Mirage F1, following Iraq which bought 60, Libya 38, Jordan 36 and Kuwait 20. [Text] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 17-23 Nov 80 p 31]

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IRAN

IRAN REPORTEDLY RESUMING OIL EXPORTS TO SOUTH KOREA

WA141127 London REUTER in English 1107 GMT 14 Nov 80

[Text] Seoul, 14 Nov, REUTER--Iran is about to resume oil exports to South Korea despite the continuing war with Iraq, officials of the South Korean Ssangyong refinery said today.

The National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) suspended exports to the Ssangyong and to other buyers after Iraqi planes attacked Iran's main Khark Island oil loading terminal in late September.

Western oil industry officials said they considered that total Iranian exports of nearly one million barrels per day (BPD) of crude and products were lost to the world market, although the Iranians insisted they could get some oil out despite the continued Khark Island shutdown.

None of Iran's buyers had disclosed any resumed shipments until Ssangyong officials said today that NIOC had cabled to say it would send the company 900,000 barrels between 15 and 20 November.

The oil would be shipped from Lavan Island, south of the Gulf war zone, NIOC said.

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2

IRAQ

TREMENDOUS RESILIENCE OF DOMESTIC ECONOMY EXTOLLED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 24-30 Oct 80 p 44

/Article: "Iraq's Reserves Are Enough for 4 Years and Are 15 Times Greater Than Those of All International Monetary Fund Countries."/

/Text/ It is well known that Iraq's reserves are being used to cover Iraq's needs for various foreign currencies arising from foreseen and unforeseen imports.

Going by figures published by the International Monetary Fund, Iraq stands absolutely in the forefront of countries in terms of the solidity of its financial and monetary status.

The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq declared that the ratio of foreign reserves to total imports for the member countries of the International Monetary Fund as a whole last year came to 26.8 percent and that the foreign reserves were adequate to cover requirements for 3 months and 23 days.

He added that the ratio for Iraq, applying the same criterion, came to 402.9 percent, or 15 times the ratio of all the countries in the International Monetary Fund, in the past year. In other words, Iraq's balance is adequate to cover Iraq' imports of all goods and services for a period of 48 months and 15 days!

Mr Hasan al-Najafi gave as evidence statistics bearing on member countries of the OPEC organization, stating that the ratios attest that Iraq is in first place, followed by Libya, where the reserves ratio comes to 88.4 percent (enough to cover imports for 10 months and 6 days), then Saudi Arabia, with 76.6 percent (enough to cover imports for 6 months and 2 days), and Kuwait, 60.7 (enough to cover imports for 7 months and 3 days).

The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq said that the figures for 1980, the current year, underline the fact that Iraq's reserves ratio is increasing and exceeding the figures mentioned above. He pointed out that the growth rate of Iraq's foreign assets in the last 10 months came to about 73 percent.

Mr Hasan al-Najafi stressed that the process of re-evaluating Iraq's financial and monetary condition after the start of the war, in the light of recent developments, has shown that the remaining balance of general reserves of Iraq's cash assets,

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after subtracting the amounts allocated to cover transaction commissions, will be enough to cover expenses for a full year, starting now, assuming that oil exports are entirely cut off.

He said that the Iraq's remaining foreign exchange assets would be enough for a whole year, assuming that expenditures continued at the same level as last year.

The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq pointed to the presence of a number of other factors which help consolidate Iraq's firm monetary situation. Among them are the foreign currency reserves of the al-Rafidayn Bank, foreign remittances and resources in the portfolio of foreign currency assets.

He stated that although Iraq enjoys the right to withdraw the amounts needed for financing from the Arab and international organizations which it belongs to, it will not, in its current monetary situation, draw any amounts from these organizations next year or any future years.

The governor of the Central Bank of Iraq said that available reports and figures on Iran before the war show that its financial situation is rapidly turning worse. He added:

"Iran's foreign assets declined by \$13,144,000,000 since last February and in comparison with its status at the end of 1979. The accelerated loss of oil revenues, the carelessly studied depletion of foreign reserves, and the extensive process of property and capital smuggling have led to a weakening in the country's financial powers, and the deteriorating situation in the financial and monetary spheres in Iran will be among the factors hastening the fall of the Iranian regime."

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JORDAN

IMPACT OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR ON PALESTINE ASSESSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 pp 16-17

[Interview with Minister of Information, Mr 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah: "War Will Not Stop Action on Palestinian Scene;" in Amman, date not given]

[Text] The Jordanian minister of information, Mr 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah assured the correspondent of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Amman that the war in which the Arabs were presently engaged was a fair war that will not affect the terms of actions on the Palestinian scene.

[Question] What are the motives and the terms of Jordan's evident commitment to the war in which Iraq is engaged?

[Answer] We are convinced that Iraq is engaged in a fair war. Iraq is not an aggressor; it is merely warding off the danger that is surrounding it, and it is asking for legitimate rights that pertain to two matters:

- 1. Its right for sovereignty on its land and its waters.
- 2. Its right to prevent foreign intervention in its internal affairs.

These two rights are affirmed in official protocols that are recognized by international protocols and documents. It is for these reasons that we stand beside fraternal Iraq so it can regain its rights. We are reaffirming that Jordan is supporting Iraq by [providing it with] all the means it can possibly need and by providing support in political, media and diplomatic areas.

[Question] Some European media circles have been saying that the Iraqi-Iranian war has obscured the Palestinian question, especially in the media. What is your opinion about that?

[Answer] The Iraqi-Iranian war did not and will not stop action on the scene of the Palestinian question. We must not make the mistake of confusing the fact that the world press has turned and focused [its attention] at the present time to the Iraqi-Iranian war with the action that is taking place on the international scene for the Palestinian question.

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The fact that the press is focusing on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict is natural because a war is going on, but this shift [in interest] does not mean that Arab effort on the international scene and the world's interest in the Palestinian question have ceased or waned.

If we were to look at matters from another angle, we would see that media attention always shifts to a more troubled area. By comparison, the Arab-Iranian struggle reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle to regain Palestinian rights. In both cases we find ourselves facing a common question: a foreign power usurping the rights of another nation and refusing to recognize the legitimate rights of that nation. If injustice continues, the use of armed force becomes inevitable as is the case now in the Iraqi-Iranian war.

[Question] There are those who say that recapturing from the Iranians the land around the Shatt al-'Arab waterway paves the way for recapturing Palestine from the Zionist enemy. How would you comment on this?

[Answer] When Iraq is reassured about its rear front, it will mobilize its efforts and its capabilities to help the other Arab nations and to launch a common war of liberation against the Zionist enemy. There is no doubt that today Israeli aggression is assuming new forms of expansion and control at the expense of Arab land. We must rise to the level of competent confrontation against Israel. This development will not come about from a vacuum or from abstract hopes. The records of Arab wars provide clear evidence that fraternal Iraq sent its forces whenever the Arab area came under Israeli attack. Iraq sent its forces under circumstances that were difficult militarily. There have been vivid examples of this since 1948. In the city of Janin on the occupied West Bank the graveyard of those who lost their lives in the Iraqi army attests to that. In 1967 people lost their lives again, and the evidence for that lies in the graveyard in Wadi Shu'ayb in Jordan. In 1973 Iraq provided vivid evidence of its pan-Arab hopes and sacrifices when it stood beside Syria against the forces of Israel.

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LEBANON

SITUATION IN AL-NABATIYAH AREA DESCRIBED AS TRAGIC

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 pp 4-8

[Article: "That Tragedy of Southern Lebanon: City of Death; al-Nabatiyah Lives Half of Its Day Under Ground Because of Indiscriminate Shelling; Destruction of Houses and Fall of Dead and of Wounded Is 'Routine Sight'"]

[Text] Southern Lebanon's crisis has become fully known. The war there is stopped only to be resumed with ferocity. The citizens have become accustomed to the Israeli shelling and to the absence of the Lebanese government, now that the fall of the dead and the wounded and the destruction of homes has turned into a routine daily sight.

What exactly is happening in this part of Lebanon? How do the citizens live their daily lives?

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI correspondent takes you in this reportage to al-Nabatiyah area in southern Lebanon to present to you examples of the tragedies and tribulations taking part in this area.

They call it the castle of steadfastness. It has endured more shells than any of the other Lebanese cities. Hundreds of its houses have been destroyed and hundreds of martyrs have fallen in it. It has lived with the state historical negligence and suppression. Its people have a deep-rooted history of struggle. It is al-Nabatiyah area that has been dedicated throughout the past 5 years to resistance—a castle in the face of the Zionist enemy. Al-Nabatiyah area includes nearly 50 villages, in addition to the city of al-Nabatiyah which is the district capital and which is considered the vital artery through which all the economic relations and services pass to the surrounding villages. The city of al-Nabatiyah has shouldered the burden of this war and has gotten the lion's share of the Zionist enemy's shells. A Palestinian refugee camp in this city has been completely destroyed by the [Israeli] air force and hundreds of civilians and military men have fallen martyrs in it.

To give a complete picture of what is occurring in al-Nabatiyah, the consequences resulting from what is happening and the dimensions of what is happening, we must backtrack a little.

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Since the independence era, al-Nabatiyah area has been suffering from deprivation, misery and social and economic backwardness. The political history of this area has seen, as a result of the eruption of the civil war, the domination of political feudalism and the effacement of the area's public interest and its replacement by individual interests. Consequently, development projects and planning have been absent from the area and the social services have disappeared. The adoption of this policy has led to abandoning the fateful issues, especially the defense of the south.

Al-Nabatiyah in Figures

Al-Nabatiyah area, with its 95,000 inhabitants (before the war), lives on the crops that agriculture produces—crops constituting the area's sole production and comprised of tobacco, grains and olives. These are crops that rely on rainwater and in which a state economic policy is absent. For a long time, no development operation has been adopted for these agricultural sectors. Agricultural exploitation has continued to be an individual activity in which the family, and the labor it provides, play the fundamental role of production.

This economic policy has forced numerous families to emigrate from their villages to the cities in search of a livelihood and of work outside the agricultural sector. This emigration has included broad groups of the young members of the middle classes and this demographic movement has led to devoiding the area of its inhabitants.

In the educational sphere, there was only one elementary school in the area until 1950. In the mid-1960's the number of schools rose to 40 substandard schools.

In 1967, an institute for male and female teachers was founded in the area. But this institute has now been closed because of the war and its work is confined to graduating a small number of students from a 6-month course. This educational situation has been coupled with numerous obstacles, including school buildings and playground, shortage in teaching staffs, shortage in equipment, high fees in the private schools, monopolization and high prices of textbooks.

In the sphere of health, al-Nabatiyah area has suffered from an enormous shortage in physicians, hospitals and clinics.

Before the outbreak of the civil war, there was only one state health clinic in the city of al-Nabatiyah which served the inhabitants of all of al-Nabatiyah area villages. This was in addition to two social welfare clinics operating in the villages. With the emption of the civil war, these clinics were closed. There were also in the area 12 [private] clinics, i.e. at the rate of one doctor per 8,000 inhabitants—most of these clinics have now been closed—and only 3 pharmacies located in the city of al-Nabatiyah. There was also one hospital which never operated in the required manner and which was closed during the events.

The city of al-Nabatiyah is distinguished by its geographic location which has permitted it to be the strategic link for the exchange of goods and commodities. The city has thus turned into a popular weekly market which is held every Monday. However, this market has not been held regularly because of the outbreak of battles in southern Lebanon.

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War Against al-Nabatiyah

After the 2-year war, the Mount Lebanon battles stopped and the fighting was transferred to the South where the Zionist-isolationist alliance has opened a constant and daily battlefront with the aim of devoiding the south of its inhabitants and of striking its vital utilities. This has led to mass emigration from the area and this war has generated sharp social crises and vast destruction among the broadest popular [poor] sectors, especially the tobacco farmers.

This reality which has characterized the area has imposed a new kind of approach on the national parties and the Palestinian resistance.

In the sphere of health, the National Movement has taken the initiative and has set up health clinics and has repaired the schools through the action of popular committees in the villages and the axes. In this regard, the work of the Lebanese Popular Rescue Establishment in al-Nabatiyah area must be noted. Since the war, this establishment has come to represent the only health organization actually present in the area—an organization that has made its services available under the most difficult and explosive military conditions.

Death Triangle

This talk about the city of al-Nabatiyah, which lives under difficult circumstances these days, remains general. The daily bread of this steadfast city and of some neighboring villages has become the Zionist shells coming from various artillery weapons.

Al-Nabatiyah is nearly 30 kilometers away from Sidon, the capital of the south.

To reach al-Nabatiyah, you have to pass through three roadblocks set up by the joint forces of the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian resistance. After the final roadblock at the entrance to the city, caution starts. Few cars drive through speedily because at a few hundred meters of the roadblock is located the triangle of death, as the inhabitants call it, of al-Nabatiyah-Kafr Rumman-Jabbush crossroad—a triangle constantly exposed to shelling.

Numerous victims have fallen on this crossroad, beginning with the triangle and proceeding along a broad and long autostrad filled with holes caused by shells.

On the sides of the autostrand, one can clearly see the evident effects of the shelling on the buildings, houses and shops, most of which have been closed. Incidentally, the premises of the Lebanese Popular Rescue, the only health organization in the area, is located in the city center. Ambulances and hundreds of citizens seeking treatment gather in front of this building and a few steps away, there are several crossroads branching out into the various quarters of al-Nabatiyah city which is facing the war. These crossroads meet to link with a long road leading to the city's main center—the commercial center. You cannot believe the destruction you see. There isn't a house, an ordinary shop, a wall or even an electricity pole that has not been hit by shrapnel and that does not bear the traces of the shelling. You can see almost no inhabitants on the balconies of buildings. The shops that have opened for business are almost empty

of customers. You move a little ahead along the long street only to face a large number of shops that have been destroyed and blackened by fires and by phosphoric shells.

The sole commercial center for the inhabitants of al-Nabatiyah area is located in the city's main square. There, vegetable, clothing and sweets vendors gather and in this place, a man feels as if he is in a market of the 1940's. In this place, you can see caution and fear in the eyes of the people who move around quickly, carry their goods and leave hastily for their homes in fear of shelling. Al-Nabatiyah inhabitants are very few and they can notice any strange visitor among them. You find them looking at such a visitor intently and with question marks in their eyes, especially if the visitor carries a camera. I was at a loss as to how and with whom to start: With the destruction, with the sad streets or with the (empty) balconies or with all of them at once. Suddenly, my trance was interrupted by an armed man asking me: Where is your identity card? This is normal because the inhabitants of al-Nabatiyah are constantly cautious and they look into any uncertain situation. After examining the identity card, the man left me and went his way.

Since the war erupted in the south, al-Nabatiyah has been exposed almost daily to the Zionist-isolationist shelling. In shelling the area, the Zionist entity has used all kinds of internationally banned bombs, beginning with cluster and fragmentation bombs and ending with napalm bombs of various sizes and weights. Today, there are quarters that can be considered completely destroyed quarters, such as al-Bayad, al-Salam, al-Saray and Khillat al-Hawa quarters.

From 1979 and until now, al-Nabatiyah area, especially the city of al-Nabatiyah, has been subjected to indiscriminate shelling poured on the quarters, without distinction between a military position and a house. Moreover, the shelling has hit Christian and Islamic religious places.

According to the reports of the political circles in charge of al-Nabatiyah area, the material losses have been estimated at hundreds of millions of [Lebanese] pounds, including thousands of homes and vehicles, property, commercial markets, fields and crops. The number of martyrs until 1980 has been estimated at 700 civilian and military martyrs. But regardless of how big the tragedy grows, and regardless of the destruction and woes inflicted upon this area in particular, the will for steadfastness is stronger than everything and there are those who have decided to stay on the land.

Area's Market

What is the real situation of al-Nabatiyah these days? How do the inhabitants live socially and economically? What is the internal and external security situation? What is the role of the Lebanese government in the areas and what is the role of the Lebanese National Movement and of the Palestinian resistance? These are questions answered by Muhammad 'Ali Nur-al-Din, the member of al-Nabatiyah Area Provincial Political Council, who started his talk on the population situation in the area, saying:

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The city of al-Nabatiyah is divided into sections. In some of these sections, such as al-Saray and al-Bayad quarters, the population percentage has dropped to 5 percent whereas in others this percentage still amounts to 80 or 90 percent. The number of the present population does not exceed 10,000 whereas it was 35,000 before the war. Moreover, the present population is not constant and ranges from 40 to 80 percent at different times because evacuation occurs in times of tension, and there is a return in times of stability. The citizens come to the city in the morning to carry on with their commercial business and then leave it in the afternoon.

There is also a large percentage of the population that has moved its business outside the area.

Despite these conditions, the people have stood fast. The continued commercial activity in the area has been helped by the inflow of money from immigrants in Africa and the Arab countries. Al-Nabatiyah is considered the area's market and the entire production of the neighboring villages is marketed through it.

Regarding the security situation Nur al-Din has said: There is constant daily shelling against al-Nabatiyah. Most of the shelling takes place in the evening and this helps to keep down the losses in lives. The people have become used to this situation and they say that the shelling is like the rain. When the shelling starts the people hide and when it stops they come out as if nothing has happened.

As for our relationship with the government agencies, such as the district officer, it is good. Concerning our relationship with the Council for the South, we have a clear position vis-a-vis its practices, considering that the inhabitants get only a meager part of its assistance. This council relies on an (opportunistic) policy in its dealings with the area's inhabitants, as well as with the other southern areas.

Regarding the role of the Lebanese National Movement's Political Council in al-Nabatiyah area, Muhammad 'Ali Nur al-Din has said: Since 1975, the council has dealt with more than one issue, including water which it has been able to supply to more than 85 percent of the inhabitants despite the vast damage caused to the water networks.

Nur al-Din added: The Political Council compensates the families of the martyrs and the wounded fallen as a result of the Zionist military operations. The council pays 1,500 pounds to the family of a martyr and 200-1,000 pounds to the family of a wounded person. The council has also advanced substantial aid for repairing and restoring a large number of the area's schools. As for the health services, the council has advanced nearly 30,000 pounds for the network of village clinics. It also gives free medicines and in-kind aid to evacuees and to needy families.

What Do Joint Forces Do?

How about the military situation?

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The only actual force in the area are the joint forces that obstruct the almost daily Zionist attempts to infiltrate and advance toward the area. When hostile shelling takes place, these forces counter with violent shelling to silence the enemy positions. Al-Nabatiyah area is considered one of the main axes in the southern area. With the presence of Arnun Castle, which the enemy has repeatedly, but futilely, tried to occupy, this area is also a strategic area.

But what does the citizen himself say regarding al-Nabatiyah's tragedy?

How does he live there?

During a brief tour of the commercial market, we met citizen Najib Nahlah who asserted that "the situation is very bad and life is harsh. The shelling is ceaseless and we live on our nerves because the shells may pour down on us at any moment. Commerce has come to a halt and our economic situation is getting worse by the day."

Citizen Husayn Dahir: "The situation is as you see it. We adapt ourselves to the circumstances which are altogether difficult. We feel that our condition is not known and that the issues are jumbled. When there is shelling, we hide. What is worse is the commercial situation and the disruption of water and electricity services. Our concern is for the situation to return to what it was before and for the legitimate government to enter all parts of the south and not just our areas."

'Ali Sallum: "The daily shelling and the tense situation. We, the inhabitants of al-Nabatiyah, have suffered enormous losses and our life is constantly threatened."

Merchant Hasib Sallum: "We open our shops from 0800 till 1100 and then fear and caution start. We demand legitimacy [the presence of a legitimate government] in the entire south."

'Ali Haydar: "The Zionist shelling is what decides when we open our shops."

Rashid Kalut: "Nobody is satisfied with this abnormal situation. The shelling has destroyed trade, happiness and everything."

Ra'if Badr al-Din: "We demand that the government enter the border strip. The indiscriminate shelling has burnt us. The schools are interrupted and the establishments are brought to a halt. Were it not for the care that the resistance and the National Movement give us, we would be in a tragic condition."

Citizen Lubna Muruwwah: "The Zionist shelling has completely obstructed life in the area. Were it not for the will for steadfastness, you would not find a soul here. We urge the entire world to exert efforts to stop the massacre to which we are being exposed."

Jamal Fakhr al-Din: "Life in al-Nabatiyah is very hard. The criminals do not stop their indiscriminate shelling of the residential quarters. Our house

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has been hit several times. We have been fleeing to Sidon and Beirut and then returning because a man has nothing other than his land and his home. Why don't they settle this problem whose consequences we are shouldering?"

To conclude, this is the tragedy in al-Nabatiyah area, especially in the city of al-Nabatiyah itself, as told by a sample of the people. If the words of all the inhabitants of the area were gathered, we would be able to write a book that tells the painful story of this city—the city of death and of love at the same time. Were it not for the people's attachment to their soil and their love for this area, we would not find a single human being in it after all the acts of annihilation that have taken place and are still taking place.

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LEBANON

RAMIFICATIONS OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON PALESTINIAN POSITIONS IN SOUTH ANALYZED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Aug-4 Sep 80 pp 27-30

[Article: "Al-Shuqayf [Beaufort] Castle Battle; Israel Exploits Arab Neutrality To Liquidate Palestinian Resistance; Palestinian-Israeli War as It Appears Through Lebanese Magnifying Glass; Fear of Palestinian Retreat Into Interior and of Liberation Battle Launched by al-Jumayyil Against Franjiyah"]

[Text] It [the situation] has subsided in Beirut and flared up in the north and the south. Thus, Lebanon has been destined to live constantly in dark and bloody days. In the south, the Palestinians have stood valiantly in the face of an Israeli air and ground attack aimed at their artillery positions between al-Litani and al-Zahrani rivers. Meanwhile, in the northern coastal city of Tripoli, clashes have erupted between the armed organizations and many of the killed and wounded have fallen as victims. But what about the military and strategic goals of the Israeli operation and what is the Arab reply to an allout Israeli offensive against Lebanon?

This is what is answered by two political and military reports which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has received from its correspondents in Beirut and in the southern city of al-Nabatiyah.

The state has watched the battle between the Palestinians and the Israelis with binoculars. This report explains the Lebanese analyses and interpretations of the outcome of the battle and the political consequences resulting from this battle or from an Israeli offensive at a larger scale.

Beirut--Under the impact of the violent shelling against the various southern axes from Tyre to al-Nabatiyah, the Palestinian resistance and the joint forces have been creating an epic of heroism in their steadfastness in the face of the successive waves of landing and of shelling. The Lebanese state has been mobilizing its diplomatic forces for fear that the aggressions would turn into an allout offensive going beyond Israel's claim of its wish to stage deterrent attacks against the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon to prevent it from staging operations against Israel in the occupied territories.

In view of the entwinement of the Israeli goals with the nature of the international developments concerning Jerusalem and in view of the deadend reached by

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the Camp David negotiations, it has been difficult for the Palestinian leaders and the Lebanese officials to believe that what has happened and is happening is not the start of the comprehensive confrontation and the peak of the hot summer anticipated by the various Arab and international circles.

King Husayn of Jordan has expected a large-scale Israeli offensive against southern Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance has expected Israeli landing and occupation attempts in the area between the two rivers in southern Lebanon where the main forces of the Palestinian resistance are stationed.

The Syrian officials have found that these attacks may develop into an allout war against Syria and Lebanon and the western diplomats in Beirut have lost the real link between what is actually happening and the assurances of their foreign ministries that it is unlikely that the situation will reach the point of an allout explosion.

As for Israel, it has been evident from the statements of its leaders that the series of attacks against Lebanon will not stop and that these attacks are a part of measures and decisions taken to block the path in the face of likely activities by the Palestinian resistance.

Where does the information meet regarding the enemy's objectives and what is the extent which the ceaseless aggressions will reach? What are the direct effects of these attacks on Lebanon and on the international movement concerning the Middle East crisis?

State Fears New Invasion

In the wake of the Israeli landing operation in al-Nabatiyah area, John Gunther Dean, the U.S. ambassador to Beirut, contacted Lebanese Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss to inquire about the position of the Lebanese government.

Prime Minister al-Huss' position has been that the United States had to exert concerted efforts to prevent the situation from deteriorating and to obstruct the start of a new Israeli occupation of the areas north of al-Latani River, namely the areas which Israel did not reach in its invasion of 1978.

Prime Minister al-Huss says that the Israeli landing and shelling operations have taken place and have gone beyond the southern areas under the control of the UN peacekeeping forces, as they did 4 months ago, and that this confirms Israel's desire to violate these new areas despite the UN Security Council resolutions.

Al-Huss also says that Israel resorted to this approach prior to its invasion of the south in 1978 in order to prepare the public opinion to accept the invasion as if it were a large-scale act of landing, shelling or retaliation.

Perhaps what has confirmed these fears is Israel's declaration of its attack on al-Nabatiyah as a preemptive measure against the resistance and then its subsequent announcement 8 hours later that it had suffered 15 casualties, dead and wounded in the fierce battles that took place in al-Nabatiyah.

The diplomatic observers have interpreted this declaration which was made by the chief of the Israeli Army intelligence as a cover for continued and intensified Israeli attacks and as an indication that Israel shells military targets as a justification for the need to put an end to the Palestinian military presence which inflicts losses in lives on Israel.

The press conference held by the Israeli intelligence head has intensified the official Lebanese fears and has created the inclination for calling upon the UN Security Council to convene immediately. However, the diplomatic contacts, especially the contacts with the U.S. ambassador, have allayed the fears and have turned the request for the convocation of the Security Council into a stronglyworded complaint presented as a documentary memorandum to the UN Security Council members.

The fact is that the official Lebanese measures do not constitute solutions that can stand in the face of the Israeli attacks. But through these measures, Lebanon is trying to hold the Arab states and the major powers responsible for putting an end to the Israeli arrogance.

The fact is also that the Palestinian-Lebanese confrontation in the south cannot stand in the face of a large-scale Israeli invasion. However, this confrontation continues to be an indication of the steadfastness and of the will to continue the struggle against the Israeli enemy.

The continuation of this uncertain situation will inevitably reflect on Lebanon in new waves of evacuation, in sharp social crises, in Palestinian pressure on the Lebanese arena and in the subsequent negative effects and consequences to the existing political equations.

Dangers of Palestinian Retreat to Interior

The Palestinian sources say that they are aware of the dangers that may result from a likely Israeli equation and from pushing the Palestinian forces to the interior, and aware of the subsequent pressure that such developments will mean to the Lebanese arena.

However, these sources cannot find the practical solutions capable of dealing with such results and effects. They believe that obstructing the liquidation of the resistance continues to be the major goal of the Palestinian steadfastness, even if such steadfastness leads to acts of harassment on the Lebanese arena.

These sources believe that the resistance cannot respond to all the given facts when the essence of its destiny and survival are threatened because in such a case the resistance finds itself face to face with priorities that it cannot disregard or abandon.

Even though such statements are clear to the Lebanese state, this state's logic continues to be different from that of the revolution. What is noteworthy in this regard is the call made by Fu'ad Butrus, the Lebanese minister of foreign affairs, urging the resistance to exercise self-restraint and to resort to political means in its struggle. In this call, Butrus stresses the need to deescalate the military

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confrontation through Lebanon because this confrontation exposes Lebanon to the danger of Israeli invasion and does not lead to gains in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Lebanese official sources believe that the Palestinian political movement has realized a large degree of success at the international level—a success that exceeds by far the strength of the military resistance in southern Lebanon.

These sources also believe that the resistance has gone beyond the stage of emphasizing its armed struggle and that it is now in the phase of emphasizing its struggle, legitimacy and political forces. Therefore, the resistance should refrain from losing military positions for fear that it may return to the narrow confrontation after having surpassed this confrontation sometime ago.

The Lebanese official sources also believe that the resistance can exercise self-restraint in the face of the Israeli aggressions. But these sources don't know how the resistance can avoid military confrontation with the Israeli enemy who launches his attacks under the pretext of the preemptive war which means preempting any Palestinian attempt to launch attacks against this enemy.

This situation has created turmoil in the Lebanese-Palestinian relations, as well as in the Palestinian-Syrian relations.

The Palestinian resistance's relations with Damascus have been recently characterized by periods of tepidity as a result of the importance that the resistance attached to the European initiative, and to what it believed to be an inlet for expanding the recognition of its legitimacy, and of the independence of its decision at the international level.

The Palestinian sources say that the repeated Israeli attacks against the resistance may compel it to reassess its expectations of any European initiatives to solve the Middle East crisis in its favor.

These sources believe that the PLO may find itself forced to adopt a position of inflexibility toward all the initiatives projected within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are those in the resistance circles who believe that the PLO should not wait for an Israeli invasion to realize this alliance [sic], especially since the expected developments concerning the area are still remote and still waiting for the conclusion of the U.S. presidential elections.

Some of the resistance leaders go farther by saying that a turn by the Palestinian resistance in this direction [sic] will inevitably block the path in the face of the self-rule negotiations and of the issue of representation of the Palestinians.

These leaders believe that an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon will open the door for the demand to include the Palestinians living home in the self-rule negotiations, under the pretext of the absence of a Palestinian force abroad capable of claiming that it represents the Palestinians.

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These leaders believe that such an alliance [sic] can give the Palestinians flexibility of movement without turning the south into an obstacle or into a point of weakness in the Palestinian confrontation at the military and political levels.

Fear of Loss of Palestinian Independence

What prevents some of the resistance leaders from discussing these possibilities is their fear of losing independence of the Palestinian decision as a result of joining under the banner of the Syrian position. These leaders believe that such an alliance cannot continue to be within the strategy of just supporting the Palestinian struggle but will inevitably turn into a large-scale act of adoption that denies the PLO the flexibility of movement and the ability to deal with the international situation as it is doing now.

It remains to be said that the aforementioned Palestinian fears of the goals of the Israeli attacks lead to the belief that what is required at present is to create a state of vacuum and confusion in Lebanon at both the Palestinian level and Lebanese official level, as well as at the level of the declared Marunite measures for partition. All this may be a prelude for projecting the concepts of resettlement, of actual partition and of sectarian mini-states in the area.

The Phalangist sources in Beirut say that Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the Phalanges Party militias, will declare war in northern Lebanon in preparation for finding justifications for declaring an interior Phalangist coup against all the forces that are still outside the control of this party. The sources say that al-Jumayyil will do so under the (justification of the impact of the war in the north against ex-President Franjiyah and the justification of the need to declare a state of emergency to deal with this war).

The Phalangist sources say that such a step will mean declaration of the final rebellion against the Lebanese legitimate government and that the step may be timed to coincide with the likely Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon so that it may appear as a precautionary step justified by the concern for Lebanon and its safety.

Though this information meets at the goals of the Israeli attacks against Lebanon and at what is being planned within the framework of the Marunite mini-state, it is difficult to predict the results. It is also extremely difficult to conclude the direction of the expected developments in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

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LEBANON

ARMED VIOLENCE AGAINST PRESS DEPLORED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 15-21 Aug 80 pp 20-23

[Article: "Dialogue With Press With Bullets and Dynamite"]

[Text] In 1976, the premises of the Lebanese AL-MUHARRIR paper was surrounded by a combat battalion armed to the teeth and was then shelled with machineguns and rockets and set afire. The paper's chief editor was killed and a number of its editors, employees and workers were wounded. The rest escaped by a miracle. A few days ago, the office of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, AL-MUHARRIR's sister paper, was blown up with 50 kilograms of dynamite. Eight persons, most of them children, were wounded in the incident.

What happened to AL-MUHARRIR repeatedly and what AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has been exposed to in the past and at present reflects and embodies the tragedy of the Arab press, particularly the Lebanese press, with intimidation and terror. Despite this, AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI will not lose its courage and composure and will persist in its efforts to present the largest possible part of the truth to the Arab public opinion. It will not lose its faith that the dialogue with the regimes must someday take place through the freedom of expression, through the mutual respect of this freedom and through absolute adherence to democracy, regardless of the difference in the viewpoints.

Beirut--Saturday, 31 January 1976: When the darkness of the evening fell over al-Shiyah Quarter in southeastern Beirut, a relative calm prevailed over the area and only the intermitten spurts of remote machinegun fire was heard coming from the direction of the line separating al-Shiyah from the Christian area of 'Ayn al-Rummanah.

The combatants on both sides of the line were tired. It was the last day of the week, and the combatants needed to spend a short weekend behind the lines.

The editors in the offices of AL-MUHARRIR were also exhausted and were doing their work lazily on that evening while dreaming of their weekend far from the tangential line, the explosion of grenades and the shrapnel of rockets, and also far from the news and pictures of death, slaughtering and kidnapping.

The fact is that the premises was almost on vacation and only a small number of editors, administrative personnel and workers were present in it. The lights were off in most of the six floors forming the enormous building.

Suddenly, those present on the first floor heard noises, clamor and the clatter of weapons at the entrance of the building. However, they paid no attention because

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they had become accustomed to such activities from the armed elements spread all over the streets.

But they jumped quickly from behind their desks when the doors of hell opened. Their voices were lost amidst the whizz of the bullets pouring through the windows from all sides and directions. Then the roar or RPG rockets pounding the walls and then exploding in the halls and offices, destroying glass, chairs and desks.

The editors gathered in the stairway of the main building for protection from the flying bullets and shrapnel while others were daring enough to sneak a look from the rear windows to see shadows running around and vehicles moving.

The building was fully surrounded from all sides, including the cultivated land behind it. The terror intensified because it became evident that the building was being exposed to the attack of a complete combat unit with its infantrymen, rocket launchers and vehicles which were mounted with heavy machinegums. Screams interspersing the whizz of bullets and rockets were being heard clearly and those screams were orders given in a firm military tone. This means that the attack was led by trained military officers.

The lights then went off in the building and the only light remaining was the light emanating from the flash of explosions.

Order to Storm Building

The editors and employees then heard an order for storming the building and all became certain of their death. At this point, courage or the "sweetness of life," as it is commonly said, took charge of driver Abu-Mahammad and he walked to one of the balconies and fired a few shots from his pistol in the direction of one of the advancing vehicles. The reply was swift. A heavy anti-aircraft [sic] machinegun opened fire and smashed the windows of the third floor; an RPG missile landed in the office of colleague Shafiq al-Hut, the director of the PLO Office who was in charge of supervising AL-MUHARRIR paper by virtue of his long affiliation with the profession.

It is fortunate that Shafiq al-Hut was not in the room. However, he was in the building and was attending an editorial meeting in the office of Walid Abu-Zahr, the establishment's general manager.

It is also fortunate that the editors of the local section, led by colleague 'Awad Sha'ban, were not in their lobby because a second missile followed the first one and landed in the lobby, turning it upside down.

It seems that the few shots fired from the pistol of Abu-Muhammad, who survived the massacre only to be killed by a stray bullet a year later, persuaded the heavily armed attackers not to storm the building.

The attack commander, and it is said that he was an officer with the rank of colonel, changed his plan and thought of something else for these present in the building, exceeding 30 editors, employees and workers in all.

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Some of the armed men then proceeded to the main gate of the building carrying cans of kerosene which they started pouring inside the main lobby and then set the inflammable liquid afire and moved away. The commander had decided to burn the building with all those in it because the paper which kept on speaking in the name of the Lebanese National Movement and of the pan-Arab movement and which had been committed to the Palestinian revolution's strife and struggle for more than 10 years deserved to be burnt: the pens which those editors had brandished throughout that period and the editors who had endured for their belief harassment and pursuit beyond their endurance deserved to die with bullets and rockets.

Escaping Through Chimney

The tongues of flame extended to consume everything and the internal stairway turned into a chimney absorbing the heat and smoke of large amounts of kerosene. The editors trapped in the third and fourth floor of the stairway became aware of what was intended for them. They had no alternative but climb to the roof of the building and accept the risk of dying there with bullets or with the shrapnel of exploding rockets.

Walid Abu-Zahr and Shafiq al-Hut took the risk and beat all others to the roof. Colleague George Karayan, the caricaturist in the London MIDDLE EAST paper at present, led the second group which groped its way to the roof in the darkness. The black smoke rising from the fire had preceded all those present to the small lobby in the upper floor where 25 persons had gathered and were feeling around for the door to the roof without being able to find it.

The signs of suffocation started to appear—watery eyes and coughing—and then a voice shouted: "I have found it. This way." Then each colleague took hold of the hand of the next colleague to step into safety.

However, the situation on the roof was not much better. The flames of fire that had begun to consume the contents of the first, second and third floor were emitting a dark black cloud which surrounded the entire building.

Amidst the uproar, all those in the building could hear the curses of the armed attackers telling them to come out of the building so that the attackers may meet with their bullets, as they had done with their colleagues in the nearby BAYRUT paper where one of the victims of the attack was the late Ibrahim 'Amir, a capable Egyptian journalist.

The attack intensified, the smoke bacame thicker and the fire was rising higher. It became impossible to stay even on the roof of the building. The search for a solution began. The only solution seemed to be death with the shrapnel of the bullets and the rockets, burning or suffocating to death from the advancing fire or committing suicide by jumping from that steep height.

As a result of the search, one of the colleagues found that there was another building adjacent to the newspaper premises. But a distance of 2 meters separated the two buildings and one had to jump this distance to reach a square window and hang onto its sill, and then sneak from there to the building which was still under construction.

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The darkness persuaded those who were reluctant to jump. Perhaps if it had been daytime none of them would have dared to do so while seeing the deep gap separating the two buildings.

The first to take the risk was colleague 'Awad Sha'ban. It was a magnificent leap. 'Awad clung to the window sill with both hands and began his hard struggle to squeeze his body through the window. His strength almost failed him more than once. What made things more difficult is that he had forgotten to remove his heavy overcoat before jumping.

As soon as 'Awad Sha'ban made it through the window after desperate efforts, shouts rose from another colleague bringing the good news that he had found an easier way. In one part of the big building, this colleague had found a cement link connecting the two buildings and a ladder set atop this link. Anybody climbing the ladder, if he managed to survive the bullets, could easily reach the roof of the neighboring building and could proceed from there to safety.

Climbing the wooden ladder and crossing to the neighboring building was quick and easy. All survived the shrapnel by a miracle and sneaked through the neighboring building to a back street.

Count of losses

In the meanwhile, the firing subsided and the attackers began to break up their seige and to withdraw their weapons and their vehicles. They removed the roadblocks which they had set up at the crossroads leading to the premises of the famous paper, perhaps after thinking that it was certain that their bullets, rockets and fire had finished all the "criminal" writers and journalists who did not deserve to live and to enjoy the freedom, democracy and happiness which governments pour on their citizens in tons.

Two fire engines passed timidly in the face of the attackers to extinguish the fire which, along with the bullets and the rockets, had destroyed all the desks, chairs, equipment, documents, archives, photography equipment and typesetting equipment in the building.

BAYRUT and AL-MUHARRIR then started to count their losses in lives. In addition to Ibrahim 'Amir, a number of editors and workers in the offices and printing presses of both papers had been martyred or wounded in previous (attacks). Several dozen editors and workers suffering from smoke inhalation were taken to hospitals and they still suffer from the consequences of the kerosene fumes which they inhaled on that calamitous day.

It was a painful sight when the firmmen removed the debris in the passage of the first floor to find under them the body of colleague Nayif (55 years), the chief editor of AL-MUHARRIR.

Nayif Shublaq, a member of a Palestinian family known for its struggle in Palestine, had joined AL-MUHARRIR 2 years earlier when he felt that his heart was with it. The man, may God's mercy rest upon his soul, was sincere, gentle, polite and tireless.

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Fate so willed it in those critical moments that Shublaq's feet lead him from the third floor, where his office is located, to the first floor. It seems that he thought he could sneak out through the main gate and escape the siege during a short lull in the firing.

But the attackers' arson caught him by surprise and the fire and kerosene smoke caught him in the corridor. He tried to open the door to one of the offices but the door was closed. The man tried to use force, but futilely. His strength then began to wane and disappear and he collapsed on the floor, leaving his unforgettable fingerprints from the top to the bottom of the door before falling down and surrendering to his fate.

This is how writers and journalists die in the Lebanese jungle where the hearts of the armed men no longer know mercy, compassion or humanity.

This is how Nayif Shublaq died and how dozens of other journalists, correspondents and press photographers died before and after him.

What is regrettable is that some of them have died with Arab bullets and weapons and that their only crime was that they tried to earn a livelihood for themselves and for their children in a paper whose political line contradicts or disagrees with the line of the regime or of the organization that sends its fighters to discipline a newspaper and to kill its editors and writers.

At his advanced age, Nayif Shublaq used to work more than 16 hours a day to divide his energy between editing and translation in more than one sphere. He has left behind a wife and children of school age whose arms are not yet strong enough to earn their own livelihood.

AL-MUHARRIR's History

AL-MUHARRIR was a struggling newspaper that was not born with a golden spoon in its mouth, as most papers are born. It started as a weekly and when it turned into a daily newspaper, the late Hisham Abu-Zahr, its owner, thought that this step was a big risk.

Still, AL-MUHARRIR established its feet firmly among its colleague papers at a time when the Lebanese press reached the peak of its prosperity. After a while, it became the paper speaking in the name of the deprived factions in the Lebanese society, including the sons of the Islamic Shi'ite sect in the remote parts of the south and of al-Biqa'.

AL-MUHARRIR was loyal to the message of its Arab nation through its commitment to the pan-Arab line adopted by Egypt under the chairmanship of the late President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir. It endured enormous material and psychological difficulties and harassment because of this commitment.

But AL-MUHARRIR knew that this was its only way. The national [man-in-the-] street also knew that this was his paper and the paper committed to his line. Perhaps there has been in Lebanon's history more exiciting, better and more capable papers in journalistic terms. But no paper has attained the popular and political influence attained by AL-MUHARRIR in the late 1960's and early 1970's.

Then came the Lebanese war with all its whims, ugliness and massacres in 1975. AL-MUHARRIR remained steadfast on the frontline, as if it had an appointment with it, when it moved from its modest offices in Ra's al-Nab' area in the center of the city to al-Shiyah Quarter where it occupied a big building vast enough for its plans and its dreams.

Through its pages, AL-MUHARRIR struggled on the frontline alongside the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance. It never closed an eye and never rested It suffered a lot and sacrificed a lot and was exposed to more than one attack and explosion. A large number of its workers, employees and eidtors were killed or wounded.

Clash With Syria

AL-MUHARRIR became one of the war victims when it found itself before one of two options shortly after the entry of the Syrian forces to Lebanon: Either maintain the line it had followed or succumb and accept the line dictated by force.

AL-MUHARRIR closed its doors in the face of its editors and workers and stopped publication. But it opened its offices for the orphaned and poor Shi'ite refugees evicted from the south to stay in it. Walid Abu-Zahr, the brother of Hisham who died in 1970, used to say: "If we cannot continue to serve the deprived factions for whom AL-MUHARRIR has struggled on its pages, then we must open the doors of its offices for them now that it has stopped publishing."

It is painful to see the free word lost amidst the tumult of force and violence. AL-MUHARRIR was in disagreement with the position of President Hafiz al-Asad's regime. But it did not think that the disagreement would develop to the point of being settled with the force of arms. AL-MUHARRIR thought that its history, struggle and positions would intercede on its behalf with this regime if the opinions disagreed and the views differed.

Four years have passed since publication of AL-MUHARRIR was stopped. This paper was forced to disappear while in the peak of its youth and at the height of its strength and popularity. Walid Abu-Zahr says that the success of the experiment of issuing AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI from exile in Paris and the fact that this paper has been able to occupy the top position among the Arab magazines in a short period and the passage of 4 years since the suspension of AL-MUHARRIR have eliminated all regret and sadness from the heart and have cleared it of all bitterness and hatred, that is if there has been any hatred. A journalist doesn't know hatred because the requirements of the profession, the fluctuations in the political conditions and long experience teach the journalist to accept matters with their negative and positive aspects calmly, patiently, tolerantly and with self-confidence.

But the problem is not here and it is not with the press. The problem is always with the Arab regimes, their agencies, their view of the press and their approach is dealing with the press and the journalists.

Role of Lebanese Press

In the 1950's, the Lebanese press enjoyed a degree of freedom which qualified it to analyze, examine and deal in detail with a lot of what was happening on the Arab

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arena. It is no secret that the Lebanese press adopted various positions toward the various regimes existing on the Arab political arena.

But this diversity of positions permitted this press to deal with issues from their various angles, thus enabling the Arab reader to be fully familiarized with the various positions through his reading of the Lebanese papers with their various ideological and political affiliations and associations.

Some regimes used to censure the Lebanese press for this enormous difference in its positions and used to consider this difference as something shameful in democracy and in the inclinations of the papers and the magazines.

However, this difference permitted to a large degree the Arab regimes to clarify and explain their positions through what they presented and said by way of the Lebanese papers. Moreover, in the late 1960's, the regimes showed greater acceptance of this big difference in the positions of the Lebanese papers and in their news coverage of the details of the internal situation in any Arab country.

Today, the situation is completely different. The Lebanese war and the presence of 25 militias and armies in an area of no more than 10,000 square kilometers no longer permit the press freedom to breathe.

In fact, more than one paper has been forced to close its doors and journalists and owners of successful press establishments have emigrated to publish their papers and to state their opinion from exile.

It seems that the Lebanese press is determined to continue to perform its role despite all that it has endured. It is a role which this press believes to be as much in its interest as it is in the interest of the Arab public opinion it addresses, and even in the interest of the Arab regimes that have become distrubed and are becoming disturbed by the freedom of the Lebanese press or its long tongue.

The truth is that it is difficult to discuss with any Arab "progressive" or "conservative" regime its political principles. There is generally a feeling among the Arab world journalists and thinkers that the regimes prefer to hear only their own voices which are reflected on the pages of their papers, and to see only their pictures reflected on their small [television] screen. These regimes get annoyed and complain if their voice is mixed with discordant voices or if another image interferes with or distorts their image.

The fact is that the issue is not the issue of the press but the issue of Arab public opinion which feels today that it has a right to know more than what is intended for it to know. The mail received by any Arab newspaper or magazine overflows with that sweeping yearning to know what is happening in every country and what thoughts and plans are occurring to the mind of every regime.

The Lebanese press, or rather the independent Arab press, if we may use the expression, cannot ignore this strong yearning for knowing and for keeping up to date, otherwise it will lose the justifications for its existence and continuation.

Perhaps it is better for the regimes themselves to permit the independent Arab press to perform and keep up its previous role. What the independent press publishes

is tantamount to a real safety valve for every regime and such a regime must accept this simply and as a matter of fact.

It is no disgrace for a labor or political demonstration to be staged in any Arab country. Demonstrations are staged in all countries of the world and riots do occur. But such demonstrations and riots are not ultimately the criterion for the popularity of a ruler, otherwise we would consider the regime of (Anwar) Hoxha in Albania the world's most democratic and popular regime and Thatcher's, Carter's or Giscard d'Estaing's regimes the most dictatorial and most hostile to the masses.

The real fear for the future of the regimes must emanate from their negative conduct toward their press. Stifling the freedom of expression, intimidating a paper and releasing the [security] agencies to pursue journalists block the safety valves. It is true that such conduct prevents the publication of what the regimes consider unfair to them and to their reputation. But such conduct does not serve the regimes in the end because blocking all the outlets in the face of the peoples makes them turn toward other outlets to express their political and social opinion, thought and positions.

The danger lies in peoples turning to negativity and violence to express this opinion. It must be said calmly here that the mistake is not the mistake of the press which writes and publishes about what takes place. The mistake is in the action of the political leadership.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, whose offices in Beirut were blown up last week, can still say its piece and offer its advice without abandoning its mission or the policy it has adopted.

The acts of blowing up, murder, assassination and terrorization do not constitute an ever-lasting solution to the problem of the freedom of expression or to silencing the counter opinion. It may be possible to intimidate a paper, silence another and eliminate a journalist from the way.

But ultimately, another solution must be sought. This solution must accept what is published with utter simplicity, even if what is published is unfair. There are other means for correcting information and clarifying positions. Each regime always has at its disposal adequate, and more than adequate, information media to correct any tendentious report or opinion published by a paper.

This acceptance of the counter opinion cannot be actually realized through taming or through the display of force by every regime. There are fundamental priorities and principles in which the Arabs must believe and upon which they must actually act.

Ultimately, democracy is the fundamental school of government. A paper's report or opinion, for example, cannot be accepted if the opposed view or opinion of the political, vocational and unionist bodies and organizations of the country cannot be accepted.

When listening to these opposed voices becomes an ordinary tradition in every regime, it will then become possible to listen to an opposed broadcasting station

or to read an opposition paper without letting the blood boil in anger and without reaching for the holster to shoot. This is because the word is like air and it is difficult to penetrate with bullets, regardless of how skillful the shooter is.

When the building doorman asked the two what their business was, they told him with utter simplicity, while the back of one of them was straining under the weight of the sack of explosives weighing almost 50 kilograms, that they wanted to visit a relative in the fourth floor.

Less than half an hour later, the building doorman, his wife and two children and four other children in the building were writhing on the floor, bleeding profusely from injuries sustained as a result of the horrible explosion.

The suite of the building occupied by AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's offices had also turned into a heap of rabble, debris and fallen walls.

We wish that the leader of every organization and agency, rather every Arab ruler and official could find the time to have a look at the offices of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in the first floor of the highrise in Ra's al-Nab' Quarter which is overcrowded with people and residents.

The building itself is narrow and jammed with residential apartments occupied by middle-class or poor families, each with no less than 5 or 6 children.

How, by what right, who is responsible and where is the humanitarian element and the moral justification?

It seems ridiculous at times to discuss matters in this manner or to raise questions in this way in Lebanon--a country that no longer deals with logic or with words.

The destroyed office of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Ra's al-Nab', small and modest as it was, was the office from which AL-MUHARRIR had been issued. Its rooms contain the memories of a number of the brightest stars of the Lebanese press in our time. It is enough for us to note that Ghassan Kanafani, the Palestinian man of letters, journalist and martyr, worked at one of the desks of these offices one day.

Finally, is the tragedy a tragedy of the Lebanese press? We do not at all think so. It is the tragedy of all of us, we the Arabs, as establishments, regimes, press, organizations, agencies, rulers, ruled, innocent and henchmen.

Where to? Nobody knows.

The tragedy will not push us to despair and it will not make us say, for example, that Anwar al-Sadat's regime--towards which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has directed its cruellest arrows of criticism--has not yet sent anybody to blow up its offices.

The tragedy will not push us toward despair and frustration and will not make us say that the limited democracy in Israel permits the left to demonstrate against the most violent, criminal and radical Zionist forces and organizations. We, the Arabs, are still scared, frightened and unable to tell the regime "no," just a single servile, defeated, whispering and low "no."

Thanks

[Text] A decision has been issued by the Press Censorship of the Lebanese General Security banning the entry of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI to the Lebanese territories.

The Lebanese censorship had permitted the entry of edition No 181 of Al-WATAN AL-'ARABI and allowed its distribution. But the patrols of the Syrian Deterrence Forces confiscated this edition from the vendors, markets and bookshops 2 days later.

AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI does not blame the Lebanese censorship because this paper knows that the "heart is willing but the flesh is weak," as the saying goes. However, the paper has no doubt that it will return to the Arab reader in Lebanon soon.

Thanks to those who have banned the entry and distribution of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI and thanks to those who have confiscated it from the markets. The ban decision and the confiscation measures will let the paper enter the heart and mind of every reader in Lebanon and throughout the greater homeland.

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MAURITANIA

BRIEFS

CLOSURE OF IMAPEC--The Spanish fishing company IMAPEC [Mauritanian Fishing Industries] whose headquarters is located in Nouadhibou, decided on 27 October to permanently close its doors and to lay off all its Mauritanian employees (33 people who reportedly have not been paid for several months). In connection with this, Sidi Ahmed Ould Bneijra, the governor of Dakhlet Nouadhibou, stated that "the region's authorities and the Ministry of Fishing will not agree in any event to the blackmail that IMAPEC has been practicing for several months by waving the threat of laying off its employees so as to force Mauritania to accept an agreement with the Spanish fishing shipping business that is contrary to the new fishing policy." The governor explained that the leaders of the company are trying to establish a fait accompli by informing the workers that they have decided to close the factory. "But," he added, "we have already let these same leaders know that closing the factory goes through bankruptcy proceedings and consequently therefore the filing of the company's balance sheet." On 30 January, Mauritania condemned the fishing agreement previously reached with Spain because of the new fishing policy that Mauritania proposes to enforce. In spite of several contacts between the two countries, no agreement seems to be in sight (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 15 August 1980, p 2025). In recent months, Mauritania has stopped and boarded several boats, mostly Spanish, that were fishing illegally in Mauritania's waters. Specialists estimate that the primary catches in recent months in Mauritania's waters were unloaded at Las Palmas. Mauritania's Ministry of Fishing indicated (see MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 22 August) that Mauritania would not allow boats to fish in its waters to offset fees. This system of "fishing licenses" that used to exist was abolished 2 years ago because Mauritania considered the use to which it gave rise excessive. This system was replaced by the setting up of mixed companies to ensure both fishing operations at sea and processing and packaging on land. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Oct 80 p 2549] 9064

GORGOL NOIR PROJECT BIDS--The office of research and development of SONADER [National Rural Development Company] (P.O. Box 321, Nouakchott, Telex: 807 MTN) is issuing an invitation for bids for technical assistance for the duration of the work (3 years) of installing irrigation in Gorgol Noir so as to ensure the supervision of this project that has been divided into three portions: A) construction of an arched dam in reinforced concrete; B) construction of feeder channels; and C) construction of a secondary irrigation system. This invitation is divided into three parts, two of which are being offered to French companies: Part 1) project director, open to everyone; Part 3) supervision of the construction work in portions B and C, open to agencies approved by the Saudi funds. The specifications notebook can be requested through CFCE in Paris. Cost: 5000 Mauritanian ouguiyas. Closing date: 30 October 1980. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, in French 17 Oct 80 p 2549] 9064

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NEUTRAL STAND IN WAR--At first resolutely pro-Iraq, Mauritania is now becoming more neutral in the Iraq-Iran war. This sudden change was brought about by President Chadli Bendjedid during the official visit to Algeria of the Mauritanian Head of State, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla (28 September- 1 October). [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 29 Oct 80 p 58] 9592

STRENGTHENING SENEGALESE FRONTIER FORCES--In the beginning of October, the Mauritanian Army strengthened Senegalese frontier forces. Namely in Kermassen, Rkiz and facing the Senegalese town of Podor. Official motive: to prevent infiltrations of members of the ADM, the Alliance for a Democratic Mauritania. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 32] 9592

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QATAR

BRIEFS

PURCHASE OF SHIPS, MISSILES--LEMONDE reports that in late September, Qatar and France signed a sales agreement covering naval-related equipment valued at 1.5 billion francs. The agreement calls for France to deliver to Qatar three guided missile ships armed with Aerospatiale Exocet antiship missiles, plus coastal batteries of Exocet surface-to-surface missiles. If this agreement is confirmed, it will mark the first sale of the coastal-defense version of the Exocet weapon system. [Text] [Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 18 Oct 80 p 76] 8041

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SAUDI ARABIA

FRENCH INDUSTRY CHOSEN TO MODERNIZE NAVY

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 1 Nov 80 pp 39, 41, 43

[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Upgrading and Expansion of Saudi Navy"]

[Text] The large order received by France from Saudi Arabia for naval armanent will serve to considerably strengthen the Saudi Navy which has been equipped with small ships up to now.

The 14.4-billion franc Sawari contract covers essentially three major categories of materiel and services: rapid-reaction frigates, rescue helicopters and helicopters armed with antiship missiles, and crew-training equipment plus logistical support for the aforementioned materiel.

More specifically, the contract calls for France to supply the following over a 5-year period:

- a. Two 10,800-ton replenishment fleet tankers. These are a lighter and simplified version of the 17,800-ton La Durance-class tanker. These support vessels can replenish a group of small- or medium- tonnage ships at sea or in an anchorage. They will hold approximately 5,400 tons of liquid cargo and 400 tons of dry cargo. Their main deck will accommodate one helicopter.
- b. Four F-2000 frigates designed for antisubmarine, antiaircraft, and antiship combat operations. They are 115 meters long and have a full load displacement of 2,600 tons. They have a cruising range of 6,500 nautical miles at a speed of 18 knots (maximum speed: 30 knots at 2,200 tons). They will be armed with a 100-millimeter automatic turret, twin-barrel 40-millimeter guns, a battery of 8 naval Crotale surface-to-air missiles (range: +10 kilometers), a battery of 8 long-range-up to 180 kilometers--naval Otomat surface-to-surface missiles, and 1 Dauphin 2 helicopter armed with 2 or 4 short-range--15 kilometers--AS.15TT air-to-surface missiles.
- c. Twenty-four SA 365F Dauphin 2 helicopters. Four of these are the search and rescue version equipped with an ORB-32 Omera radar, and will be delivered first. The other 20 are the antiship version equipped with the Aigron 15 radar and armed with AS.15TT missiles. These helicopters will operate from both land bases and the frigates.

d. Approximately 200 all-weather AS.15TT air-to-surface missiles.

This contract involves mainly eight French armament firms or agencies, not to mention numerous subcontractors. These eight firms and agencies—some of which exhibited the materiel to be supplied Saudi Arabia at the 1980 Naval Show—are:

- a. DTCN [Technical Directorate for Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering]: construction of the first of the four F-2000 frigates, and prime contractor for all ships.
- b. CNIM [Mediterranean Marine and Industrial Engineering Company]: construction of the 3 other F-2000 frigates.
- c. La Ciotat Shipyards: construction of the two replenishment fleet tankers.
- d. Thomson-CSF: prime contractor for weapon systems and the electronic equipment for the frigates.
- e. Aerospatiale: prime contractor for the Dauphin 2-AS.15TT weapon system, including supplying the helicopters and missiles.
- f. Matra: prime contractor for the Otomat weapon system in its new "compact" version.
- g. Sofresa: technical assistance and liaison with the Saudi Navy.
- h. NAVMCO (Navy COFRAS): personnel training and equipment maintenance, including establishment of a military armament maintenance facility on one of the Gulf's two major Saudi bases.

Most of the contracts awarded the French firms and agencies are fixed-price contracts. The contract with NAVMCO is between 1.2 and 1.4 billion francs. Matra's contract represents about 10 percent of the amount of all contracts combined, i.e. some 1.4 billion francs.

Saudi Arabia thus becomes the eighth country to have ordered the Otomat long-range, antiship weapon system which Matra and OTO Melara of Italy developed jointly with their own funds. The Saudi Navy was particularly impressed with the Otomat's over-the-horizon targeting capabilities.

Aerospatiale's share of the overall Saudi contract amounts to 2 billion francs, half of which is for the Dauphin 2 helicopters produced by its helicopter diversion, with the remaining half for the AS.15TT missiles developed by its tactical missiles division. Actually, the Saudi order will enable Aerospatiale to finish developing the AS.15TT weapon system. That development is currently 50 percent complete. The AS.15TT is a follow-on to Aerospatiale's AS.12 antiship missile, some 8,000 of which have been produced for 25 countries. Considering its priceabout 0.7 million francs—and its performance—accuracy of its radar guidance system—the AS.15TT is also expected to find success in the international market—place. Aerospatiale thus expects to sell from 8,000 to 10,000, perhaps 12,000

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AS.15TT missiles over a 10-year period. Because of the prospects for expanded use of armed helicopters in navies throughout the world—500 helicopters outside the United States over a 15-year period—Aerospatiale is, therefore, currently revising—downward—the price of its fire—control units in an effort to enhance the AS.15TT's acceptance over its competitors.

Thomson-CSF, however, has become the most important French contractor in the Saudi deal as a result of an agreement it signed on 17 October with the Ministry of Defense. Under the terms of that agreement, Thomson-CSF is assigned a major role in the implementation of the program's three principal categories of materiel and services.

It will be responsible for all weapon systems and avionics systems aboard the four F-2000 frigates. These systems include the following: the Sea Tiger IFFintegrated search radars; navigation and helicopter data-collection radars; electronic countermeasures equipment; SENIT 6 [Naval Tactical Data Handling System] equipment for the processing and display of tactical information; new modular, tactical information display consoles; Castor 2 gun fire control systems; Diodon antisubmarine warfare sonars with fixed and towed bases; and naval Crotale weapon systems for air defense of the ships against armed aircraft and helicopters as well as sea-skimming surface-to-surface missiles. Thomson-CSF is also supplying Agrion 15 radars for the Dauphin 2 helicopters. These radars will be used to guide the AS.15TT missiles and provide over-the-horizon target detection and designation for the Otomat missiles. It can also serve as a search radar and to relay tactical information to the ships. In addition, Thomson-CSF is supplying such missile components as the Otomat's seeker and the AS.15TT's remote control altimeter--receiver. The company is also responsible for equipping Saudi Navy schools and logistical support centers with complete sets of weapon systems and other materiel similar to those installed on the ships and helicopters, plus simulators for the training of operators and maintenance technicians.

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SYRIA

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ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD DETAILED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 pp 18-21

/Article by Tammam al-Barazi: "What Are They Preparing for the Next Stage?--The Moslem Brothers in Syria"/

/Text/ There are no sources which give the detailed history of the growth of the Moslem Brothers' Movement in Syria. Although there are dozens of books, sources and documents on the history of the brothers in Egypt from the thirties to today, works giving the history of the movement in Syria are almost nonexistent. This may be explained by a number of reasons, among them the fact that until recently the movement in Syria did not leap into the forefront of events through armed struggle as did the movement in Egypt through its clash with Nasir since the fifties, in spite of the political and intellectual role Syria's brothers played since they rose up in the thirties.

While in the past months this role has assumed the character of violence and direct armed conflict with the Syrian regime, with the objective of bringing it down, for numerous reasons we will address ourselves to presently, the Moslem Brothers' organization has in fact been present on the Syrian stage since the thirties.

The growth of the movement of the brothers in Egypt was one of the factors encouraging and contributing to the formation of the organization in Syria (in this regard see AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, issue 189, 26 September 1980, p 26.

At the beginning, the matter was restricted to small societies, such as the Society of the Young Men of Muhammad in Damascus, the Dar al-Arqam Society in Aleppo, the Islamic Society in Hamah and most particularly the Society of the Moslem Young in Damascus, which played a growing role in the context of coordinating the various Islamic societies. The most prominent men in the Moslem Young were Salah-al-Din al-Shash, one of the men who took over the society's secretariat general, and 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Azraq, who was one of the most prominent judges in Syria at that time.

In 1945 the Society of the Moslem Young changed its name to the Moslem Brothers; thus the name of the movement appeared for the first time in the history of Syria.

The reason for the new title may be attributed to the contact between some leaders of the Moslem Young (including Salah-al-Din al-Shash) and Imam Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, who urged that the title "Moslem Brothers" be endorsed.

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Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i (from Hums, a teacher of Islamic Law at the Faculty of Canon and Islamic Law at Damascus University) was the first person to bear the name "General Overseer" of the movement in Syria (the movement in Egypt endorses the title general guide rather than general overseer).

No one disputes al-Siba'i's role in stimulating the movement. In this field he played an important part. He participated in the armed resistance against France in 1945 and the Palestine War of 1948. It is well known that the organization of the brothers in Syria contributed a full brigade of volunteers to this war.

In 1947, the first legislative elections took place in the country. The Moslem Brothers embarked on "the struggle" with a number of candidates, of whom only Muhammad al-Mubarak, in Damascus, won.

The movement accused the government of rigging and interfering in the elections.

In the 1949 elections, Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i won as deputy from the city of Damascus.

The name of Mr 'Isam al-'Attar arose in 1945 when for the first time he was assigned the responsibilities of the deputy general overseer as a result of Dr al-Siba'i's trip to Europe on a study mission. He assumed the same responsibilities again in 1957 after the general overseer came down with an illness which prevented him from exercising his tasks. In 1958, with the declaration of the Syrian-Egyptian union, political organizations, the Moslem Brothers among them, were dissolved.

The movement took a distinctive position on the union, announcing its support of it in principle, as it abstained from signing the secession declaration. However, it opposed 'Abd-al-Nasir's policies and practices and accused Nasirism of "dictatorship" and other harsh epithets.

The first contact the brothers in Syria had with the Egyptian regime, 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime specifically, goes back to 1956, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal. At that time the Egyptian minister plenipotentiary in Syria, Fathi Ridwan, met with al-'Attar (in the presence of Mr Mahmud Riyad, at that time the Egyptian ambassador to Syria), requesting that the brothers stand alongside Egypt in the nationalization struggle and turn over a new leaf in their disputes with 'Abd-al-Nasir over the crisis with the brothers in Syria during that tense stage.

It is well known that this crisis reached its peak at that time, especially after the arrest of large numbers of people and the execution of others, including 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Awdah and Muhammad Farghali.

In fact, at that time the brothers in Syria did issue a statement supporting the nationalization of the canal and their readiness to participate in war should Egypt be exposed to a foreign invasion. However, their opposition to Nasir suddenly remerged sharply after the dissolution of the organization in 1958, when they refused to enter the National Federation and decided to continue their activity in secrecy.

Z

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Secret Activity

Then the secession occurred.

The country prepared for new legislative elections.

'Isam al-Attar entered the 1961 elections in Damascus at the head of a list including Zuhayr al-Shawish, 'Umar 'Awdah al-Khatib and Sa'id Ramadan. The four won.

al-'Attar was elected general overseer of the Moslem Brothers in Syria at that time, in the presence and with the support of Dr Mustafa al-Siba'i, who died as a result of his ailment in 1964. al-'Attar's star as a tough politician and consummate orator rose in that period. Then the 28 March 1962 military coup took place (the commander of the army at that time being 'Abd-al-Karim Zahr-al-Din). The president, Nazim al-Qudsi, and the prime minister, Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, were arrested. The commander of the army tendered an invitation to 13 persons (including Akram al-Hawrani, Bashir al-'Azmah, and 'Isam al-'Attar) to take the reins of power and form a new government. The brothers severely opposed the plan to appoint Bashir al-'Azmah to the premiership.

The brothers launched an intense campaign against al-'Azmah in the mosques, through Friday sermons in particular, warning of the "Communism" of the new premier and refusing to take part in the government.

After a while, the cabinet resigned. Toward the end of 1962 the government of Khalid al-'Azm came in. 'Isam al-'Attar says that he was offered the ministry, specifically the tasks of the deputy prime minister, representing the Islamic current in the country, but declined. He nominated some people who sympathized with the brothers. Thus Hamid Mazhar al-'Azmah, 'Umar 'Awdah al-Khatib and Dr Nabil al-Tawil were chosen from this orientation.

The litany of events repeated itself. There was the 8 March 1963 coup which brought to power Law'i al-Atasi (head of the Revolutionary Command Council) and Salah al-Bitar (premier). In 1964, al-'Attar left Syria to perform the pilgrimage. On his return he was prevented from entering his country. He tried a number of times, but failed. He had to emigrate to Lebanon (a year after he was asked to leave the country), then Jordan, then Belgium and Germany, specifically the city of Aachen, 85 kilometers from Cologne, from which he still runs the Moslem Brothers' organization, and the Islamic Cultural Center and Bilal Mosque in the city.

In this regard al-'Attar says that he doesn't know the reasons why he was prevented from going back. No specific charges were directed against him. He was taken by surprise by the confiscation of his moveable and immoveable goods.

These, most succinctly, are the most important developments in the brothers' movement and political positions prior to the latest "military movement" of confrontation with President Hafiz al-Asad's regime.

There is another story to this movement.

Armed Clash

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Before we take up the latest developments which the brothers' movement in Syria had gone through, it is necessary to shed some light on their internal organization and their goals as declared in the charter.

Membership is divided into six ranks:

Assistant, member, worker, fighter, union chief and deputy.

One of the requirements of the first stage is that the member be proficient at reciting the holy Koran; he must study the life of the prophet and religious ritual law and memorize 40 traditions from the biography of the prophet. Then comes the second stage; here the member must memorize the Kiranic chapter of al-Baqarah, as well as studying books of religious jurisprudence and history.

In the third stage, the member must specialize in the study of a specialized field such as the bases of religious jurisprudence, semantic jurisprudence, history or beliefs.

The main administrative bodies are:

- 1. The general overseer--the general head of the body, the Guidance Office and the Founding Body.
- 2. The General Guidance Office, which is the highest administrative body of the brothers, supervisor of the course of proselytization and the guide and director of its policy.
- 3. The Founding Body, which is the general consultative council of the brothers and the general assembly of the general guide's office. The general overseer must be a member of the Founding Body, must have spent 5 years as a member in it, and must not be less than 30 years old.

He must possess scholarly and moral qualities and be chosen from the members of the Founding Body at a meeting attended by at least four fifths of the body's members. He must obtain three quarters of the votes of those present. After the general overseer is elected, he must resign from his private work. He is not permitted to participate in economic or commercial activities. If he violates his duties he must withdraw from his position. The Founding Body may also decide to excuse him by the agreement of three quarters of the members.

- 4. The centers or the administrative committees in each center (the center of Hamah, the center of Latakia, the center of Aleppo, and so on).
- 5. The activities committees (cultural, athletic, media and other activities).

The organizing law is not secret; rather, it is widely known and published. Reading the law of constitution of the brothers' General Body issued 8 September 1945, and the law on the general bylaws issued in November 1950 will help define the goals of the society. Article Two of the law, for instance, states:

"The brothers are a comprehensive Islamic body striving to achieve the goals for whose sake the pure Islam was revealed and to present them in a manner consonant with the spirit of the age, bringing hearts and spirits together over these

Koranic principles, bringing the viewpoints of various Islamic groups closer together, and striving to raise the standard of living, to develop, protect, and liberate national resources, to achieve social justice for every citizen and to combat ignorance, disease, poverty and evil."

Article Three of the law states the methods which must be followed to achieve these goals:

"Proselytizing through publications, the press, magazines, and books, sending out delegations and missions domestically and abroad, observing up bringing, bringing about the meaning of religious devotion in the practical sense not the verbal sense in the spirits of brethren, and training them in a proper fashion, physically, through sports, spiritually, through worship and intellectually, through scholarship. It also aims at setting forth proper platforms in all affairs of society, from education to legislation, the judiciary, administration and economics, bringing these platforms to the legislative, representational and executive bodies so that they may emerge from the context of theoretical qualification to the role of practical application, and also to strive to establish economic, social, and scholarly religious organizations by establishing mosques and schools."

If we refer to the Moslem Brothers' public statements dealing with the goals of their movement, these concentrate on a number of points, most prominent of which

Propagating God's call among the people in a manner which is pure, free of flaws, and living and connected to the age and its problems and to the present and its requirements.

Gathering together persons who have responded to the call to Islam, steeping them in its culture, educating them in it as individuals and groups, making them capable of bearing it, and organizing their efforts to work for it and wage holy war on its behalf.

Facing modern intellectual, social, economic, political, and moral cultural challenges.

Getting sound genuine Islamic movements and people sincerely working for Islam to know one another, progressing toward unity and bringing the message of Islam to the world.

These are general goals. What, however, are the brothers aiming at today in Syria? What are their goals or demands in this regard?

The brothers, with their varying tendencies (about which we will talk shortly), do not hide the fact that they are trying to bring down the Syrian regime. They express this through eight demands:

 A stop to arbitrary arrests, brutal torture, show trials, open and secret murders, all forms of repression and terror incompatible with God's law and human rights, and the immediate release of political detainees and prisoners.

- 2. An end to the war on Islam and various Islamic elements.
- 3. Elimination of the state of emergency declared in the country on 8 March 1963 (that is, more than 16 years ago).
- 4. Elimination of the exceptional courts which do not provide legal guarantees and whose judges are generally not subject to the authority of the Higher Judiciary Council.
- 5. Respect for human rights and basic human freedoms, Islam and the divine religions have codified them and as has been stated in the International Declaration of Human Rights dated 10 December 1948 and other international statements and agreements on that subject.
- 6. Granting freedom of opinion in speech, writing and publication and the freedom to meet, demonstrate and form parties.
- 7. Termination of dictatorial rule in its various individual, party, factional and military forms.
- 8. Adoption of suitable wherewithal and measures to enable the people to make a totally free choice of their system of life and government by themselves and to take the reins of their affairs entirely in their hands in their present and future.

Today the brothers are actually divided into three main tendencies (if we except the extremist elements supporting the Islamic Liberation Party established by Taqial-Din al-Nahbani in 1951):

- 1. 'Isam-al-Din al-'Attar's wing.
- 2. Eng 'Adnan 'Aqlah's wing.
- 3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah's wing.

Though this breakdown is incorrect in emphasizing "persons" alone, it in any case expresses a specific actual situation. This is because al-'Attar has considered himself head of the organization since his election as general overseer in 1961. Today he issues a monthly magazine from Germany bearing the title AL-RA'ID, along with other publications in Arabic, English, German and Turkish. He considers that the Fighting Vanguard (the mujahids), under the leadership of 'Adnan 'Aqlah, are an offshoot of the movement of the brothers as a whole. AL-RA'ID adopts the positions of the Fighting Vanguard but differs with the Moslem Brothers in Egypt ('Umar al-Talmasani) on numerous points, among them their position on Camp David, since al-'Attar calls for a more hostile position toward al-Sadat's regime. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah's wing (among whose most prominent pillars is Sa'id Hawwi) issues the bulletin AL-NADHIR which publishes the military data on the Fighting Vanguard and gives it material support.

The AL-NADHIR group is very active in a number of Arab countries. It differs with al-'Attar and does not consider him a leader of the movement. It is in total agreement with the brothers in Egypt and cooperates with them in the context of the international organization, which also includes the Moslem Brothers in Lebanon (whose most prominent men are Fathi Yakan, Faysal Mawlawi and Muhammad 'Ali Dannawi).

In the magazine AL-DA'WAH, which is the organ of the brothers in Egypt, the AL-NADHIR group published, under the title "A Statement on the Truth" (No 45, February 1980, p 60), the statement that al-'Attar "has not represented the Moslem Brothers closely or remotely in Syria or any other country for years."

AL-NADHIR also says that a general conference of brothers was held in Damascus in 1971 which declared the election of a new general overseer, Mr 'Adnan Sa'd-al-Din (55 years old, born in Hamah, now teaching in a Gulf state). al-'Attar has not responded to that, but he stresses that he is the historic leader of the brothers, and his circles stress that the "disputes" are in the course of being resolved and that an announcement will soon be made on total coordination among the various tendencies in the context of the escalation of the campaign against the Syrian regime.

The fact is that the brothers' latest military escalation in Syria was led by the Fighting Vanguard (the mujahids) and that it has issued a magazine in its name, AL-NASR. However, only one issue of that came out, since its offices were attacked and 11 responsible figures in the media apparatus of the organization were killed.

The Fighting Vanguard is the military wing, if the statement is proper, of the brothers' movement, and it is an organization which was derived from al-'Attar's brothers. The late Marwan Hadid, the leader from Hamah, founded it; the mujahids appeared on the Syrian scene in 1975 when Hadid decided to take the movement into Damascus to confront the excesses of the regime by armed force and assassination. The movement gained organizational and leadership independence in the latter part of 1975. It believes in a "holy war" of confrontation with the regime. After Hadid died in combat, Eng 'Adnan 'Aqlah (28) took over leadership of the vanguard. This command is situated inside Syria. 'Aqlah is pursued night and day by the by the "special forces" and "defense companies." It is bruited about that Mr Rif'at al-Asad promised to give a reward of 1 million Syrian pounds to anyone leading to the discovery of 'Aqlah, dead or alive.

The Syrian newspaper TISHRIN has published a picture of him, but the brothers' circles assert that it is not a picture of him.

'Aqlah is still alive and well and has never been arrested, in spite of the statements some circles in Damascus have spread about. He leads the struggle "militarily" from inside Syria.

How Is Contact Made Inside?

What is the number of mujahid personnel? How is the brothers' movement abroad coordinated with the brothers inside?

Naturally one cannot disclose the secrets and methods of the movement here. There are people who say that the vanguard organization's armed trained personnel present inside Syria today are greater than 7,000. The regime's circles answer that the number is much exaggerated.

Meanwhile the circles of the vanguard reply "The number is much greater than some people imagine, especially when we take into consideration the material aid people give the organization in one form or another."

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What there is no doubt about is that the Fighting Vanguard organization has extensions in the army which constitute a permanent vexation for the regime. Many changes in responsibilities and a series of "purges" which resulted in the release of a number of officers or their transfer to civilian sectors have been made within the military institution.

Arms are "smuggled" into Syria, through Lebanon in many cases, and the "cassettes" or "recorded conversations" of the brothers' leader 'Isam al-'Attar are used as a means of psychological mobilization. Secret publications also enter Syria continuously by numerous means. One can say that there is "permanent contact" between the outside and the inside.

This question remains: has the Syrian regime succeeded in dealing the armed organization a conclusive blow? Why have the armed operations quieted down lately?

The Arrest of Zuhayr al-Shawish

Informed sources assert that the Syrian regime has failed to stifle the movement in spite of the campaigns of torture, constant pursuit and methods of terrorization and enticement.

The same sources assert that the "arrests," "surrenders" and "withdrawals" from the organization which the authorities are announcing every day do not correspond to reality, on grounds that they are not devoid of exaggeration and inflation. Sources among the brothers state that Syrian intelligence has resorted to various means to unearth organization cells and leaders inside the country, with no results. Three months ago in Beirut, operatives of this intelligence force arrested Mr Zuhayr al-Shawish (manager of the Islamic Office publishing house and one of the brothers' historic heads), even though he had broken off with the organization years before and had devoted himself to commercial activity (publishing and distribution). He was taken blindfolded to Damascus. Through threats and enticements, he was requested to give a talk on Syrian television supporting President Hafiz al-Asad. He refused to do so, and refused to state one word during the investigation while he was blindfolded. He was released after intense Arab pressures at the highest levels.

According to sources in the brothers, the "silence" which the brothers are keeping today on the domestic scene, may be ascribed to "tactics" during which some cards are being shuffled, military mistakes of the past are evaluated, and plans for the future are reworked, in the light of developments which have newly arisen.

The fact is that the Moslem Brothers are not leading the opposition movement alone. There are other political leaders who have effective weight and roles. These leaders are also holding the reins of many matters in the context of political confrontation and movement, working in utmost secrecy, far removed from media commotion.

The process of change cannot take place apart from them. Naturally, talk about these leaders has many aspects, and does not lie within the scope of this file.

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SYRIA

RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IRAQ EXAMINED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Mohamed Selhami--passages between slantlines orginally published in italics]

[Text] Damascus is no longer a pleasant city where one saunters along breathing deeply of the evening breeze. Today, pedestrians, their faces anxious, desert the streets at sunset. Damascans are afraid. Afraid of the present and of the future. Afrain of the "lunacy" of the Muslim Brothers. A fusillade here, a bomb there. Even in the cinemas in the populous quarters. The police retaliate. More and more active, the police chase and kill terrorists wherever they can find them. The Iraqi-Iranian war has added to the tension. Iraq, a next-door neighbor, is tied to Syria through history, through blood, and...through the socialist Arab Baath, in power in both countries, though the "brothers" are "enemies."

/"When Iraq sneezes, Syria is sick, and vice versa /"a high Syrian official tells us. This is why the conflict over the Schatt-al-Arab has direct consequences for Syria. On the economy, in particular, which is beginning to suffer from the closing of the frontier with Iraq. The people in the north can no longer trade with their neighbors. Already, those in the south are no longer going to Jordan and they avoid Lebanon.

To this geographic and economic isolation must be added the psychosis of a new war with Israel. A war that the Syrians believe already doomed because of Sadat's reversal and the unavailability of Iraq.

Do the leaders really regret this unavailability? In truth, the man on the street is not unaware of it: they are encouraging it [Iraq's unavailability] by supporting Iran politically even militarily. Mistrust requires it: 40,000 soldiers have been dispatched to the border between Deir Ex-zor and Albu Kamal. Similarly, President Hafez el-Assad has allowed certain Iraqi opponents in exile in Damascus to go to Tehran where they are helping the Iranians against Iraq. During this time, the Syrian press daily accuses the Baghdad regime of hegemonism and expansionism. And the man on the street wonders.

/"We are with the Soviet Union. So is Iraq. Logic would dictate that we support Baghdad...,"/ says a disquaire [translation unknown] from the Hamidya quarter,

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quite taken aback. The Syrians, moreover, hardly support the official position. They would prefer to remain neutral. /"To condemn Iraq is to condemn the future,"/ we are told by an army general who does not see how Baghdad could one day pardon Damascus for "straying." Not that he fears Iraqi vengenace--/"We are strong enough to defend ourselves"--but /"we need Iraq to be able to stand against Israel some day."/ This what nearly all Syrians are feeling who object to this war /"because it aggravates the disunity of the Arab world."/ For the political leaders, on the other hand: /"Iran has become, since the fall of the monarchy, a powerful ally of the Arabs. We must help it to recover its wind."/ Is this the real reason? /"Certainly not,"/ a professor tells us. /"The principal reason is the fragility of our regime, which would be discomfited by an Iraqi victory. For we can't forget the rivalry between the two Ba'ath regimes."/

But which of the two Ba'athist factions is the more fragile? That of Baghdad has plunged itself into a suicidal war. That of Damascus is at the mercy of Muslim extremists who are threatening its stability, And which an overly aggressive flirtation with Khomeyni can only encourage.

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WESTERN SAHARA

MOROCCO SEEKING CONCILIATION WITH ALGERIA REGARDING SAHARA

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Nov 80 p 27

[Text] Since July 1980, meetings have been taking place between Morocco and Algeria in Geneva, Paris and Ryad. On Sunday 19 October a Hassan II aide-decamp, Col Skirej, went to Algiers, carrying a message from the King to President Chadli Bendjedid. The content of this message has not yet been disclosed, however, there is every indication that it contained a reconciliation proposal.

Indeed, the Moroccan sovereign has incessantly multiplied his offers to make peace with Algeria. For example, on the occasion of the reassembly of Parliament (11 October), or following the earthquake in El Asnam (10 October), then on the day of sacrifice (10 October). Hassan II even urged the Moroccans to donate all the skins from the sacrificed sheep to the Algerian victims.

Thus, in Rabat, everything possible is being done to effect a reconciliation with the neighbor. Or almost everything for there remains the battle against the POLISARIO. The POLISARIO and, of course, Libya, its supporter, /"to the detriment of Morocco but also of Algeria"/[in italics]. The attack launched by the Sahraouis against the locality of M'Hamid, in the beginning of October, made Hassan II state that Algeria /"could not consent to an attack aimed at a symbolic town"/ [in italics]. As a matter of fact, it is in M'Hamid, following the independence of 1956, that King Mohamed V called for the liberation of the Sahara.

The POLISARIO, nonetheless, is not easily discouraged. On Sunday 26 October it launched a new offensive in the Haouza region. Four days earlier, it had led an attack around Ras el-Khanfra. In both cases, the fighting was hard and required the intervention of the Moroccan air force. The results of the attacks are as usual contradictory, depending on whether they come from Rabat or Algiers.

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WESTERN SAHARA

ALGIERS DENIES CONTACTS WITH MOROCCO REGARDING SAHARA

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 7 Nov 80 p 2954

[Text] Last 30 October, the NATO General Assembly Decolonization Committee, by 49 votes against 6, which included Morocco, and 44 abstentions, passed a resolution supported by some 40 countries. Among the latter was Algeria which reiterated "the inalienable right of the Western Saharan people to self-determination and independence and the legality of the stuggle they are waging for the exercise of this right."

The resolution addresses a new appeal to Morocco "to join in the forceful peace effort and put an end to the occupation of Western Sahara." It insistently invites Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, "representative of the Western Saharan people," to enter into immediate negotiations for the purpose of arriving at a final settlement of the matter. Besides Morocco, Senegal, Zaire, Israel, Guatemala and Guinea voted against this matter.

The approved resolution also welcomes the OAU [Organization of African Unity] endeavors, but, in addition, "reaffirms the United Nation's resolution to cooperate fully with the OAU in order to enable the Western Saharan people to exercise their right to selfdetermination and independence."

On the other hand, the committee rejected a Morocco-Senegalese resolution, expressing satisfaction with the peace plan to which the OAU Committee of Wise Men is committed and asking all the states to refrain from any activity which could interfere with this plan.

Although this new stand taken by the United Nation's fourth committee delighted the Saharans, it was a very keen disappointment for Rabat as it was very pleased with the resolution on Western Sahara, proposing a mediation by the "Nine" between Algeria and Morocco, which the European Parliament Policy Committee passed 2 weeks ago. The Moroccan daily paper, OPINION, Istigal organ, whose leader is M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of foreign affairs, regrets that the United Nation Committee had "jeopardized" the peace plan undertaken by the OAU to find a peaceful solution to the Saharan problem, by passing the resolution sponsored by Algeria on this matter.

After having emphasized that the real solution to the Saharan problem lay "in the undertaking of negotiations between Rabat and Algeria," the paper stated that "the restoration of Sahara to the mother country was irreversible as it is legitimate and in conformity with the principles and norms of international right."

On the other hand, regarding the rumors that are going round about the alleged immediate and secret contacts, at a somewhat high level, between Algerians and Moroccans on the Saharan affair, we notice that they were recently flatly denied by the two countries. In Paris, Mr Boucetta did so officially in a statement to the AFP [French Press Agency], adding however: "Our concern is mainly to create a climate of trust and cooperation."

In Algiers, from a less official source, they stressed that Algeria's position regarding the clash of interests over Western Sahara, which is setting the POLISARIO Front against Morocco, has not changed. For the Algerian Government, the Western Sahara affair is a decolonization problem with which the two main parties, the POLISARIO Front and Morocco, should come to grips. This attitude, they repeat, is in principle not at all inconsistent with the assistance given to the Saharans for the same reason that it is given to other national liberation movements.

The Algerian daily paper, EL MOUDJAHID, on 2 November, has itself formally denied the reports coming from abroad regarding the existence of such contacts between Algeria and Morocco. It clearly states that these "rumors" were purely deceptive measures intended to confuse and delude the world at the very time when the United Nations General Assembly was looking into the Western Saharan records.

"As if Algeria were going to prove false to its principles and negotiate at the expense of the Saharan people," EL MOUDJAHID went on to say, and accusing Morocco of "persisting in its desire to delude the international community, while seeking to make it believe that the Western Saharan problem is the result of an Algerian-Moroccan bilateral clash."

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WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

SDAR EMBASSY IN LOME--New SDAR Embassy [to be built?] in Lome some 100 km from the one in Cotonou (Benin). The POLISARIO thus seems to have more financial resources at its disposal than several constituted states that prefer, as far as they are concerned, to have one single agency for the region in one capital or another. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Oct 80 p 31] 9064

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